



**FEDERATION FRANÇAISE DE  
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Paris, le 17 août 2005

Mmes – MM. Les Présidents des Ecoles Agréées,  
des Sociétés d'Enseignement,  
des Associations affiliées, des Ligues et des  
Comités Départementaux  
Directeurs Techniques, Membres de la DTN  
Plieurs / Réparateurs  
DGAC: Monsieur Jacques HOUGET  
DGA: Monsieur Frank PERRIN

Ref: JMS / 05 / 1863

Objet : Sacs OMEGA de la Société PERFORMANCE VARIABLE

## DIRECTIVE TECHNIQUE N° 15

### **Matériel concerné :**

Sac-harnais OMEGA de la société PERFORMANCE VARIABLE,  
modèles XXS, XS, M, L, XL et TANDEM

### **Rappel :**

Suite à divers interférence et accrochages supposés, constatés ou démontrés de suspentes de voilure principale avec le rabat supérieur du conteneur principal ; ces accrochages ont entraîné des décousures du rabat et/ou des interférences avec le déploiement de la voilure de secours.

La FFP et Le LBA (services techniques allemands) ont émis respectivement un " flash sécurité " et une " Emergency Airworthiness Directive " interdisant l'emploi de tous les sacs-harnais de type OMEGA (voir flash sécurité FFP en date du 11 juillet 2005 et AD D-2005-248 en date du 12 juillet 2005 : Annexe 1).

### **Mesures prises :**

- ✓ le constructeur, après analyse, a émis un bulletin service référencé SB-0-200501 en date du 18 juillet 2005 (Annexe 2) imposant une mise à niveau avant retour en service
- ✓ Le LBA a émis une consigne de navigabilité référencée D-2005-248R1 en date du 21 juillet 2005 (Annexe 3)



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- ✓ La fédération a analysé un sac-harnais de taille XS impliqué dans un incident ainsi que d'autres, de taille M, L, XL et tandem précédemment en service.
- ✓ L'analyse des matériels :
  - Montre que le rabat en cause dans les incidents et accident fait partie d'un ensemble rabat inférieur du conteneur secours (rabat numéro 3) et supérieur du conteneur principal (rabat numéro 2). Formé d'une seule pièce, il est relié au rabat numéro 1 du conteneur secours par une couture de 160 mm environ (modèle XS). Dans le rabat supérieur du conteneur principal est inséré un raidisseur trapézoïdal supportant l'œillet (voir schéma)
  - Montre la possibilité d'interférence entre la base du rabat du conteneur principal au niveau de son agrafage sur la base du conteneur secours. Cette couture laisse une partie libre entre le rabat et le conteneur secours (voir schéma)
  - Montre la possibilité d'étranglement, par une ou des suspentes, du rabat supérieur du conteneur principal entre son agrafage et le raidisseur trapézoïdal, support de l'œillet (voir schéma : Annexe 4)
  - Montre que la géométrie de cet ensemble de rabats est la même pour tous les OMEGA, seules leurs dimensions augmentant de manière sensiblement homothétique.
  - Montre une évolution du raidisseur sur les derniers sacs-harnais produits vers un modèle dont le grand coté du trapèze est en demie lune (voir schéma)

## **EN CONSÉQUENCE :**

La Fédération Française de parachutisme **IMPOSE** pour la remise en service dans les structures fédérales de **TOUS les sacs-harnais OMEGA** :

- **l'application du Bulletin service** : SB-0-200501 en date du 18 juillet 2005 émis par la société PERFORMANCE VARIABLE.
- **La mise au dernier standard** du rabat supérieur du conteneur principal par changement du raidisseur trapézoïdal pour celui mi-trapézoïdal, mi-demi-lune du dernier standard 2005.
- Les travaux devront être obligatoirement être effectués par le constructeur ou par un organisme habilité par écrit par lui.
- Les travaux seront consignés dans le livret parachute.



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- Les propriétaires devront se procurer auprès de PERFORMANCE VARIABLE la dernière version du manuel de pliage. Référencé EH-O-Q01, révision 4, en date du 18 juillet 2005.
- A chaque pliage de la voile principale, le plieur contrôlera l'état des deux coutures " BARTAC "
- Toute détérioration des coutures " BARTAC " entraînera :
  - l'arrêt des sauts avec l'équipement concerné
  - Son signalement à la FFP (déclaration d'incident)
  - Son signalement au constructeur.

**Date d'application : dès réception.**

**Jean-Marc SEURIN**  
**Directeur Technique National**



## Airworthiness Directive

**D-2005-248**

## Luffahrt-Bundesamt

Airworthiness Directive Section  
Hermann-Blenk-Str. 26  
38108 Braunschweig  
GERMANY

### PERFORMANCE VARIABLE e.K.

Effective Date: 12 July 2005

#### Affected:

Kind of aeronautical product: Personal Parachutes  
Manufacturer: Performance Variable e.K., Am Tower 16, 54634 Bitburg, Germany  
Type: Personal Parachute OMEGA ( ) / QUICK ( )  
Models affected: OMEGA XXS, XS, S, M, L and XL (Container-System) with QUICK 120, 135, 150, 180 or 220 (Reserve Parachute)  
Serial Numbers affected: All serial numbers  
German JTSO-Authorisation No.: LBA.O.40.014/05 JTSO

### ----- EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE -----

#### Subject:

Personal Parachute OMEGA ( ) / QUICK ( ) - Malfunction of the Main Parachute in combination with the Container-System

#### Reason:

The Luffahrt-Bundesamt (the CAA of Germany) has received two reports of incidents and one report of a fatal accident, on which the Main Parachute in combination with the Container-System do not fully deploy. The real cause of these incidents and the fatal accident is still unknown and under investigation. Therefore, currently it is unknown whether the root cause is limited to a design, operational or maintenance deficiency. We are issuing this emergency AD to prevent further potential incidents or fatal accidents, which may be result in serious or fatal injury to the personal parachute user.

#### Compliance/Action:

As of the effective date of this AD, the following actions are required by this airworthiness directive:

----- THE USE OF ALL THE OMEGA ( ) / QUICK ( ) PERSONAL PARACHUTES IS PROHIBITED -----

Any further use of the Personal Parachute OMEGA XXS, XS, S, M, L or XL (Container-System) with QUICK 120, 135, 150, 180 or 220 (Reserve Parachute) is PROHIBITED.

NOTE: This is a interim AD action and will be amended in light of the results of the investigation.

#### Effective Date:

Effective on receipt from 12 July 2005.

#### Technical publication of the manufacturer:

-- None --

#### REMARKS:

Enquires regarding this Airworthiness Directive may be directed to Mr. Steffen Engel, Projects Equipment, Luffahrt-Bundesamt, Division T2, Hermann-Blenk-Str. 26, 38108 Braunschweig, Germany,  
- Telephone +49-(0)531-2355-428,  
- Fax +49-(0)531-2355-723,  
- Email [Steffen.Engel@LBA.de](mailto:Steffen.Engel@LBA.de) .

#### EASA-Approval

The Luffahrt-Bundesamt has issued this Emergency Airworthiness Directive in accordance with Article 10.1 of European Union Regulation No. 1592/2002.

Affected Equipment: Omega Container-System XXS, XS, S, SS, M, L und XL

Reason: One or more Lines were entangled with main container flap No. 2  
(See drawing page 2)

Analysis: A combination of a couple of facts can cause line entanglement with flap No. 2 of the main container.

Reasons for these failure can be:

1. Wrong size or old rubber bands.
2. To much not stowed or misplaced line length inside the main container.
3. Opening of the main container in slightly head up or stand up position.

Recommendations:

- a. Use only rubber bands in the right size.
- b. Replace all rubber bands after 120 days or 50 jumps.
- c. No not stowed line length longer than 40 cm.
- d. Never place main risers and/or lines in a curve around the corners of the reserve container.
- e. Horizontal, stable body position during pulling the hand deploy and the entire opening of the main parachute.

See Equipment Handbook (German Version) EH-O-Q01, Revision 4 dated 01.07.2005

To avoid failure like written above and during improper use of the equipment in the future, the mirror (Flap No. 3 of the reserve container) must be sewed at the round corners with two short bartec to the flap No. 1 of the reserve container. This avoid contraction of the flap under tension while a line is tucked under. And it is easier to turn up the flap to release a line.


(This modification can be done by the manufacture or a approved person)

Compliance/Action:

1. Apply the Bartecs bevor the next jump.
2. Visual Inspection of the Bartecs by each packing of the Main Parachute.

Approval: This modification is in line with the requirements of JTSO C23d and is approved by EASA with approval no. 2005-6101.



### Accomplishment Instruction:









1. Mark out horizontal above the attachment of flap No. 3.
2. Put the grommets congruent on each other.
3. Apply a bartec (left and right) on the binding tape of flap No. 3 in the same height as the horizontal marking.

Bartec specification see drawing below!

Use only Typ E / 40, Nylon Bonded thread!






9. Prove the bartec



10. Prove the bottom side of the bartec



11. Mirror with new bartecs



Entry in the reserve data card: „ Bartec in accordance with Service Bulletin SB-O-200501 “.

Visual Inspection of the Bartecs: Bevor a reparation of a broken Bartec inform the manufacture and the LBA.





## Airworthiness Directive

### D-2005-248R1

## Luffahrt-Bundesamt

Airworthiness Directive Section  
Hermann-Blenk-Str. 26  
38108 Braunschweig  
GERMANY

Supersedure: This AD supersedes Emergency AD D-2005-248.

Effective Date: 21 July 2005

## PERFORMANCE VARIABLE e.K.

### Affected:

Kind of aeronautical product:	Personnel Parachutes
Manufacturer:	Performance Variable e.K., Am Tower 16, 54634 Bitburg, Germany
Type:	Personnel Parachute OMEGA ( ) / QUICK ( )
Models affected:	OMEGA XXS, XS, S, M, L and XL (Container-System) with QUICK 120, 135, 150, 180 or 220 (Reserve Parachute)
Serial Numbers affected:	All serial numbers
German JTSA-Authorisation No.:	LBA.O.40.014/05 JTSA

### Subject:

Personnel Parachute OMEGA ( ) / QUICK ( ) - OMEGA Container-System - Modification of Flap-No. 3, Visual Inspection of Bartecs, and Equipment Handbook Change

### Reason:

The Luffahrt-Bundesamt (LBA) has received two reports of incidents and one report of a fatal accident, on which the Main Parachute in combination with the Container-System do not fully deploy. The real cause of these incidents and the fatal accident is still unknown and under investigation. Therefore, the LBA has issued the Emergency AD D-2005-248 in accordance with Article 10.1 of the European Union Regulation No. 1592/2002, which prohibits the use of the suspected Omega Container-Systems. That Emergency AD action was necessary to prevent further potential incidents or fatal accidents, which could result in serious or fatal injury to the personnel parachute user.

The manufacturer has now developed a modification of the container flap No. 3 and a visual inspection of the new bartecs at each packing. In addition, the manufacturer has revised the Equipment Handbook to clarify certain procedures for a safe jump operation and correct maintenance tasks.

We are issuing this AD, which supersedes the Emergency AD D-2005-248, to prevent malfunction of the main parachute in combination with the container-system, caused by line entanglement with flap No. 2 of the main container. Such malfunction could result in serious or fatal injury to the personnel parachute user.

### Compliance/Action:

As indicated below, unless already accomplished:

#### 1. MODIFICATION

Prior next jump, apply the bartecs on the binding tape of the flap No. 3 of the Omega Container-System in accordance with the Performance Variable Service Bulletin SB-O-200501, dated 18 July 2005.

#### 2. VISUAL INSPECTION

As of the effective date of this AD: At each packing of the main parachute, perform the visual inspection of the bartecs in accordance with the Performance Variable Service Bulletin SB-O-200501, dated 18 July 2005.

#### 3. EQUIPMENT HANDBOOK CHANGE

As of the effective date of this AD: Perform all jump operations, maintenance actions and repairs of the Personnel Parachute OMEGA ( ) / Quick ( ) Container-Systems in accordance with the revised Performance Variable Equipment Handbook (German Version) EH-O-Q01, Revision 4, dated 01 July 2005.

**Technical publication of the manufacturer:**

Performance Variable Service Bulletin SB-O-200501, dated 18 July 2005.

Performance Variable Equipment Handbook (German Version) EH-O-Q01, Revision 4, dated 01 July 2005.

The technical publications, which becomes herewith part of this AD, may be obtained from

Performance Variable e.K.

Am Tower 16


54634 Bitburg

- Germany -

Phone: +49 (0) 6561 949680 Fax: +49 (0) 6561 949681 Email-Address: info@miskyshop.com

**EASA-Approval**

Approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) under approval number 2005-6101 on 21.07.2005.



**Schéma de l'ensemble des rabats supérieurs**